Efficient responses to climate change require accurate estimates of both aggregate damages and where and to whom they occur. While specific case studies and simulations have suggested that climate change disproportionately affects the poor, large-scale direct evidence of the magnitude and origins of this disparity is lacking. Similarly, evidence on aggregate damages, which is a central input into the evaluation of mitigation policy, often relies on country-level data whose accuracy has been questioned. Here we assemble longitudinal data on economic output from over 11,000 districts across 37 countries, including previously nondigitized sources in multiple languages, to assess both the aggregate and distributional impacts of warming temperatures. We find that local-level growth in aggregate output responds non-linearly to temperature across all regions, with output peaking at cooler temperatures (<10°C) than estimated in earlier country analyses and declining steeply thereafter. Long difference estimates of the impact of longer-term (decadal) trends in temperature on income are larger than estimates from an annual panel model, providing additional evidence for growth effects. Impacts of a given temperature exposure do not vary meaningfully between rich and poor regions, but exposure to damaging temperatures is much more common in poor regions. These results indicate that additional warming will exacerbate inequality, particularly across countries, and that economic development alone will be unlikely to reduce damages, as commonly hypothesized. We estimate that since 2000, warming has already cost both the US and the EU at least $4 trillion in lost output, and tropical countries are >5% poorer than they would have been without this warming.
Introduction
Global policy debates about climate change mitigation center on the aggregate economic costs and benefits of particular mitigation action, as well as to whom these costs and benefits accrue. Quantifying the magnitude and distribution of these costs and benefits is now a focus of a large literature, much of which has sought to empirically estimate how various societal outcomes might be affected by a changing climate. Recent efforts combine measurements of the climate system with statistical methods designed to isolate the impacts of observed changes in climate from other factors that might also affect social or economic outcomes of interest. These studies provide strong causal evidence that key productive elements of economies, from agriculture to labor productivity to human health, respond non-linearly to changes in climate. 1 Inferring both aggregate economic costs and their distribution from these multiple foundational damages, however, is often challenging. For instance, a complete accounting of aggregate costs requires both that all relevant economic sectors can be enumerated and evaluated, and also that any interaction in impacts between sectors is accurately quantified. Meeting these requirements is demanding even in data-rich environments, 2 but is likely implausible in much of the world where key sectoral data are lacking and interactions are difficult to constrain.
An alternate approach uses country-level data on economic aggregates (e.g gross domestic product) to study total damages. 3, 4 While this approach has the advantage of directly observing the aggregated net effect of myriad interacting sectors that have simultaneously responded to a change in climate, it faces its own set of important challenges. First, national accounts data on economic output are thought to be both noisy and potentially biased for many countries in the world, with alternative data sources -and even different vintages of the same data source -often showing low levels of agreement. 5, 6 Second, even if data are unbiased, measuring the response of economic output to temperature at the country level is challenging because many different producing units within a country could be exposed to opposing temperature anomalies within a given year. In fact, in large economies such as the EU countries or the US, temperature anomalies within a given year are often strongly negatively correlated across the largest producing regions (e.g. US West coast versus East coast; Fig S1a-b) . Averaging these opposing anomalies to construct a country-wide annual temperature estimates reduces the temperature signal and could greatly amplify noise in a country-level analysis (Fig S1c-e ; Methods).
Third, given the large variation in income within countries, a country-level analysis allows only partial insight into the distributional effects of warming. In particular, it remains difficult to understand whether any apparent differences in the effect of warming between rich and poor regions are due to differences in underlying exposures to harmful temperatures, or to differences in responsiveness at a given level of temperature exposure. 7 Distinguishing these effects is at the core of understanding how both past and future economic development could shape the size and distribution of climate damages. Finally, given limited country-level data, it has remained difficult to understand whether a given increase in temperature affects the level or the growth rate of output, a difference with again fundamental implications for the overall magnitude of future damages. 3, 4, 8 Here we assemble a novel district-level panel dataset on climate and GDP across 37 countries and multiple decades, using economic data from public databases and public non-digitized archives (SI Section 1) and matching them to average temperature and precipitation in each district-year using three separate climate datasets. This large dataset on over 11,000 districts allows us to use multiple sources of variation to quantify the persistent effects of warming on economic output, and to assess how these effects differ between and within countries. Our results provide a new foundation for assessment of the local and global economic impact of past and future warming.
We collect GDP data at the most local level available in existing archives, which is typically at the secondlevel administrative division of each country. We denote these units "districts" and their parent level-1 administrative level units as "states". Data are harmonized to constant boundaries over the sample period and merged with estimates of temperature and precipitation in each district-year from three separate climate datasets, [9] [10] [11] yielding 154 thousand district-year observations across Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, United States, and the EU countries, with temporal coverage varying by country (Fig 1a) . To assess data quality in the economic data, we follow earlier country-level work 12 and compare whether growth rates in subnational GDP correspond to growth rates in nighttime lights in the same location, the latter an independent measure of economic activity. We recover average nightlights-GDP relationships in our district data almost identical to these previous country-level estimates (Fig S2) , providing some confidence in quality of our district-level economic data. The range of temperature exposures and income levels in our dataset broadly reflect the global country-level distribution (Fig 1b) , and our assembled regions represent most of the largest economies globally as well as many of those judged to have the highest national statistical capacities (Fig 1c) .
To estimate the causal impact of variation in temperature on economic output, we follow a large literature 1, 3, 4 and use fixed effects regression to isolate interannual temperature variation from all other time-invariant factors or common time-varying factors that could be correlated with both average temperature and economic output. In particular, we estimate:
where i indicates districts, s indicates the admin-1 region each district falls into, t indicates years, and d
indicates data source for GDP data. The outcome y istd is the first difference in log per capita GDP (i.e.
the growth rate). f (T ist ) is a non-linear function of temperature; our main specification is quadratic, i.e. f (T ist ) = β 1 T ist +β 2 T 2 ist , and we test robustness to more flexible polynomials and splines (Fig 2) . We control for all time invariant differences between districts with district fixed effects α i ; these account, for instance, for any fixed geographic, social, economic, or institutional differences between districts. We control for common time-varying factors with a set of state-by-year fixed effects η st , which control non-parametrically for any trending variables at the state level. φ d is a data-source fixed effect, which additionally accounts for any changes in dataset within country over time that is not already picked up by the state-year FE. Given these fixed effects, our estimates of β 1 and β 2 come from comparing whether economic growth in a given district (as measured by a specific dataset) was above or below normal in a year that was warmer than average for that district, after accounting for any shocks to either growth or temperature common to districts in the surrounding state. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
Results
We find that district level economic production is concave in temperature exposure, with a negative slope throughout nearly all the observed temperature distribution and increasingly steep at warmer temperatures (Fig 2) . Results are robust to choice of temperature dataset (Fig 2b, Table S3 ), to choice of fixed effects or inclusion of time trends (Fig 2b and Fig S3a) , to using more flexible functional forms for temperature (Fig   2b) , to dropping one country at a time (Fig S3b) , to alternate approaches of excluding or trimming large growth outliers (Fig S3c-e) , and to accounting for spatial lags of the dependent variable (Fig S4) . Responses when models are estimated separately in each country are largely consistent with the pooled global response (Fig S5) , with disagreements largest in countries where the climate datasets show the poorest correlation with each other (Fig S6) , suggesting these differences could be driven by climate data quality. A model that uses the distribution of daily temperatures instead of annual average temperature to measure temperature exposure recovers a response consistent in shape with our main response, although point estimates on narrow temperature bins are somewhat noisier (Fig S7) . Our results are broadly consistent with subnational estimates from US districts 13 and state-level estimates from a global sample. 14 While estimated short-run effects of additional warming are almost identical to earlier country-level estimates for warmer regions, 4 district level estimates do not provide strong evidence of positive effects in cooler regions as was suggested in country data. Applying our estimates globally suggests that nearly all regions, including most wealthy regions, would experience reduced economic growth for any additional warming above their current 2001-2015 average temperature (Fig 2c) .
Conventional wisdom and some evidence 7, [15] [16] [17] [18] suggests that poorer individuals and regions could be more negatively affected by warming temperatures, but existing country-level analyses disagree on the source of this disparity. 3, 4 In particular, disparities in the impact of warming could occur because the poor are more vulnerable to a given amount of warming, perhaps because they more often work in climate-sensitive industries such as agriculture, or because they have fewer resources (e.g. savings) to buffer against negative shocks. Alternatively, rich and poor could have the same underlying vulnerability to warming described by a common non-linear response function, but could have different baseline temperature exposures that result in different marginal damages when temperatures rise (Fig 3a-b) . In the former case, economic development on its own would be expected to reduce future climate damages in poor countries, while in the latter case it would not. Thus distinguishing exposure from vulnerability as sources of disparity in impacts is central to understanding the magnitude and distribution of climate impacts. 7 We find that global disparities in the aggregate economic impacts of warming are more likely to be driven by differences in temperature exposures rather than in underlying vulnerabilities. In both our 37-country sample (Fig 3c) and in a separate non-overlapping sample of developing countries for which we have cross-sectional household-level wealth data (Fig S9a) , we find strong differences in temperature exposure by income level, with poorer districts being disproportionately very cold or (particularly) very hot. However, this relationship is mainly driven by differences in exposure between countries rather than within them; average cross-sectional relationships within countries are still concave but much weaker (Fig 3d and Fig S9b) . This weaker withincountry gradient is consistent with drivers of economic convergence between rich and poor regions -for instance, government transfer programs, or the mobility of factors of production such as labor, capital, or ideas -being stronger within countries than between them. 19 To assess differences in vulnerability, we assign each district in our data to its quintile in the global income distribution, and study whether temperature-growth responses to differ by quintile (SI Section 2). At most exposures, estimated responses in each quintile are not statistically different than the pooled global response, although results for individual quintiles are noisier and somewhat sensitive to how quintiles are defined ( Fig   S10-S11) . As another approach, we restrict the analysis to the US, where our dataset consists of 380 US metropolitan areas endowed with a wide range of average temperatures but all falling into the top income quintile in our global sample. In this sample of very wealthy cities, the estimated response function is again noisier but nearly indistinguishable from the pooled global response.
Why might income not be effective in moderating economic responses to temperature? While our data do not allow specific insight into the channels that mediate the economic responses we measure, a host of recent micro-level evidence suggests that temperature can negatively impact key economic inputs even in highly industrialized and climate-protected environments. These include impacts on cognitive function, 20, 21 labor and total factor productivity, 22, 23 and various aspects of health, including mental health. 24 While certain protections (e.g. air conditioning) have been shown to moderate impacts for some outcomes, 25 they do not appear effective in insulating broader economic output from the negative effects of hot temperatures.
To understand whether our estimated responses actually reflect persistent effects of temperature on output ("growth effects"), or conversely whether regions 'catch up' after a temporary increase in temperature ("level effects"), we take two approaches. Following pioneering earlier work, 3 we first estimate distributed lag models that allow a given temperature shock to affect output in both current and ensuing years (see SI).
Estimates from these models suggest similarly shaped but substantially steeper responses as compared to panels with just contemporaneous temperature ( Fig S8, Table S4 ), albeit with a slightly warmer implied optimal temperature.
Our second approach also builds on earlier literature 26 and uses the large number of cross-sectional units in our data to isolate the influence of longer-term temperature trends on output. Simple plots of the raw data suggest that, in most countries, districts that have warmed the fastest since 2000 have grown on average much more slowly than districts that have warmed the slowest (Fig 4a-l) . For instance, districts in the top decile of warming in India, Indonesia, Brazil, and China have per capita GDP (GDPc) that have grown a remarkable 56, 30, 12, and 37% less on average since 2000 as compared to districts in the bottom decile of warming.
The raw decile comparison for the US does not show this relationship, but this comparison is made off of a very small number of metropolitan areas (14 in each decile); comparisons using all US data suggests faster warming districts did grow more slowly (Fig 4g) , but estimates there are somewhat noisy as well.
To quantify these effects of longer-term warming across the full sample, for each district we regress the time series of GDPc and temperature variables on a time trend, and then estimate a long-differences regression of trend in GDPc versus trend in temperature (and trend in temperature squared, for non-linear versions). That is, we estimate:
where Y istd is log GDPc and T ist is annual temperature in district i in admin-1 region s and year t and income dataset d. To estimate these trends, we restrict ourselves to districts with at least 10 years of data (which is >10,300 districts, or 93% of our full sample). We then estimate the long differences regression:
where s indexes admin-1 regions/states and d indexes unique dataset used by each district i. To account for time-trending unobservables at the state level, and for the fact that GDP data are often derived from different datasets within the same country, we include both state fixed effects η s , which remove statespecific average trends in either income or temperature, as well as dataset fixed effects ρ d , which account for any dataset-specific differences in income trends. The model also includes trends in precipitation and precipitation squared, estimated as for temperature in equations 3 and 4. The identifying assumption in equation 5 is that temperature trends at the district level are uncorrelated with other factors that affect trends in economic activity, once state-level trends are accounted for. One concern is that emissions of pollutants could be correlated with both local economic activity and temperature. While this is not true for long-lived greenhouse gases (e.g. CO 2 ), which are rapidly mixed in the atmosphere, it could be true for short-lived pollutants such as particulate matter, which are emitted locally due to increased economic activity and also can block sunlight which leads to cooling. In this latter case, economic activity could generate cooling, leading us to spuriously attributed higher output to cooler temperatures. To address this concern, we process high-resolution satellite-based particulate matter estimates for all our districts back to 2000, using data from Our long difference estimates are not immediately comparable to our panel estimates: the former regresses change in log GDPc on change in temperature, and the latter regresses change in log GDPc on temperature in levels. To make units comparable, we use estimates from equation 1 and 5 to compute the district-level change in income that each model would estimate to have occurred in response to the warming trend estimated in equation 3. For the long differences model, given a sample length of n years, log GDPc would be estimated to change by ∆Y LD i = (β 1φis +β 2φ is2 ) * n. For the panel model, we first estimate the detrended temperature seriesT it = T it −φ i year t using the estimates from equation 3 above. We then use the panel response f (.) estimated in equation 1 to estimate the growth decrement (or increment) in each year due to the warming, and then sum these log changes across years to get the total change in log income as estimated by the panel
to ∆Y P i . Results from this exercise (shown in Fig 4n) suggest that, if anything, short-run panel estimates understate the impact of longer-term warming. These results provide strong evidence that hot years have large and persistent effects on output and that these impacts become increasingly negative at warmer baseline average temperatures.
Finally, we use our data to estimate the impact of recent historical warming on the level and distribution of per-capita GDP, focusing on the subset of countries in our sample with data back to 2000. Using our (substantially) more conservative panel estimates, we simulate how much slower or faster each district would have grown in each year over the 2000-2015 period had temperature stayed at its 1951-2000 average, and cumulate these effects over the period to calculate the increase or decrease in total output (Fig 5a-b) . Our exercise is similar to comparison with the long differences estimates above, but here we focus warming above long-run historical average rather than very recent (post-2000) warming; this distinction is relevant given substantial warming that occurred throughout much of the world in the second half of the twentieth century.
We find that recent warming has likely reduced output in most districts in our sample, with substantial negative impacts (> 10% losses) in most tropical districts as well as in warmer temperate districts (Fig 5e-h ).
However, given weak average temperature-income gradients within countries, we do not find consistent evidence across our sample that recent warming has amplified within-country inequality (Fig 5i) ; increases in inequality in some countries (e.g. the US) are offset by modest declines in others (e.g. Indonesia).
Cumulative overall impacts are nevertheless large at the country level, with recent warming having cost both the US and the EU >$4 trillion in cumulative lost output (Fig 5j) .
While it is unknown whether the response functions we estimate can be accurately extrapolated to other districts or countries not in our sample, the consistency of the estimated response when countries are analyzed independently or held out of the pooled estimation, and the similarity in response across income quintiles, suggests our estimates might be globally relevant. If this is true, then the global impact of additional warming might be more negative than past estimates based on country data, 4 given no clear evidence in the subnational data of positive effects in cooler regions. Similarly, because wealthier regions do not appear less vulnerable to additional warming, we find no strong evidence to support the notion that future economic development will protect economies from the impacts of warming -a key assumption in some integrated assessment models. 28 While it remains the case that unprecedented future adaptation could lessen climate impacts, for example through the invention of novel climate-protective technologies, such technologies did not appear to emerge during the substantial warming of recent decades.
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Supplementary Information
1 Data Construction
GDP Data
We gathered subnational data on GDP per capita or GDP and population from national statistical agencies which publicly provide these data in any formats, digitized or non-digitized. We obtained data at the most granular level available, usually at the second-level administrative division ("districts") of each country. First we started by accessing the statistical agency website of every country in the world in alphabetical order. Then we selected the GDP per capita data that were available in all districts in the majority of states of a country, have growth rates within 97.5% of those in all available sample (Fig S3d-e) , and pass the nightlights validation test (Section 1.1.1). Despite national variations in the naming convention of administrative units, we use the all-encompassing terms "state" and "district" for the first and second-level administrative divisions of each country. Table S1 lists the data source for each country in our dataset, the number of available district-year observations, and if we processed the data originally contained in non-digitized documents and spreadsheets.
In the discussion below, we refer to the European Union as a country.
We fluidly use the district definition for three countries. China's statistical agencies provide more granular GDP per capita data at the third-level administrative division. We use these data and assign the provinces in which districts reside as their parent states. United States only has four-year prototype GDP per capita data for the universe of districts, 29 so the GDP per capita of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) serve as US' most disaggregated subnational accounting. We assign the first state mentioned in the name of interstate MSA as its parent state. Lastly, we follow European Union Statistics' second-level divisions (NUTS 3) which match imperfectly with member countries' official second-level administrative units.
Except for GDP per capita data from US, Europe and Indonesia, data from all other countries were assembled from multiple sources. All districts in Brazil experienced a switch in data source because data were contained in two separate files. Similarly, Colombia experienced a switch in data source from CEDE Panel Municipal to DANE. China had used different measures of national accounting before 1989/1990: "社会总产值"
(Total Social Output Value) or "工农业总产值" (Gross Value of Industrial and Agricultural Output). To account for changes in growth rates that were caused by the idiosyncratic nature of dataset switches and measurement changes, we include data source fixed effects in our regression analyses. When we collapsed the panel data into a cross-section of districts in the long-difference analysis, the data source fixed effects is the concatenation of all data sources across years used in each district.
As district level growth rates, particularly in China, have extreme outliers (Fig S3d-e) , our baseline model trims the 2.5% tails in the growth distribution of our global sample. We attempted alternative approaches to dealing with growth outliers, such as trimming the 0.5%, 1% tails, or top-and bottom-coding observations at said percentiles, and results were not very sensitive to this choice (Fig S3c) .
Finally, in order to spatially merge per capita GDP growth rate with weather data, we performed string merging of districts and their corresponding shapefiles on names or alternative names in case of district name changes. In order to achieve the most balanced panel of districts over time, districts that split or merged are aggregated to their largest unions and these unions are kept constant over the sample period. These districts are usually observable in the data by having missing data before they split from parent districts or after they merged with other districts. We obtained a list of territorial/name changes from Statoids 93 and the Chinese Government. 94 Table S2 reports data source of shapefiles. Any remaining errors in our merging will likely amplify noise in our assignment of temperature to districts, attenuating regression estimates. 
where Y ist measures the natural logarithm of GDP of district i in state s in year t with dataset d, I ist is log average digital number of night-time lights, and X ist is a vector of controls as used in Henderson et al to account for the spatial distribution of night-time lights (number of pixels with maximum digital number (top-coded), minimum digital number (unlit), and the Gini index of light distribution). Figure S2 plots the β 1 coefficients from pooling all countries into one regression as well as from running a separate regression for each individual country. Ecuador did not pass the nightlights validation test (β 1 = −0.229) and has been removed from the final dataset.
Weather Data
Our main annual average temperature data are derived from Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature (BEST) 9 gridded data at 1 • resolution. We use two additional temperature datasets at different resolutions, namely March, while all other districts follow January to December annual average temperature. Our precipitation data come from University of East Anglia's CRU TS 4.01 data. 10 Finally, as a robustness to our temperature measurement, we also used number of • C days that fell into a given set of intervals (or "bins") in a year to measure temperature variation, the data for which came from daily BEST gridded data. 9
Simulating the consequences of aggregation
To better understand and illustrate the gains from having sub-national granular data on both output and temperature, we show how patterns of spatial correlation in local temperature anomalies can lead to noisy inference in country level data. In particular, after taking out temperature trends, historical temperature anomalies across the largest metropolitan in the US are often negatively correlated, and the same is true in many other regions (Fig S1a-b) . To see the implication of these negative correlations for country-aggregated data, consider two years which at the country level had the same output and same average temperature: one year in which temperature and output were normal in both the East and West, and another in which the temperature (output) was high (low) in the East and low (high) in the West. This second year, while showing strong local responses to temperature, would show no aggregate response at the country level, and would not contribute variation to our understanding of temperature's effects on output (nor, importantly, would it bias our understanding; it would simply not provide information).
To quantitatively explore these implications, we run the following simulation. We define the true response of growth to temperature at the district level as y it = β 1 T it + β 2 T 2 it + ψ t + it , using the detrended observed T it time series in each district i and setting β 1 = 0.02, β 2 = −0.001. ψ t ∼ N (0, 2) is a common growth shock in each year and it ∼ N (0, 2) is a district specific shock. We then use these constructed outcomes and observed temperatures to estimate a district fixed effects regression
then save the coefficient estimates on temperature. We then generate growth aggregates y t = i y it , and temperature aggregates T t = i T it and T 2 t = i T 2 it . We then run the time series regression at the country level:
where θ * year t is a country time trend. We again save the coefficient estimates on temperature. We repeat this process 1000 times.
In Figure S1c , black lines give responses estimated using the district data, and red lines give the estimated response from the country time series. Panels (d) and (e) show distribution of parameter estimates across bootstraps for the district panel model (black lines) and the aggregated country model (red lines). Aggregated country-level estimates are unbiased but much noisier that district estimates and can get the sign of the true effect wrong. In essence, given the structure of temperature anomalies in our data, aggregation can substantially reduce the variation that can be learned from. Our district-level data are able to leverage variation that country aggregates cannot.
Estimation
Our main panel fixed effects regression is given in the main text (Equation 1). To study quintile-specific responses, we interact the temperature response function with quintile dummies:
where D j is an indicator for whether district i falls into the j-th quintile.
To study whether effects of temperature on growth are persistent, or whether there is "catch up" in the next period, we follow refs 3, 4 and estimate a distributed lag model and include up to five years of temperature or precipitation lags:
with persistence assessed by adding up the contemporaneous and lagged coefficients. That is, with f (T ist ) = β 1 T ist + β 2 T 2 ist , then the marginal effect of a degree of warming is:
We also estimate a long-differences regression as described in the main text.
Calculating the cost of recent warming
To understand the cost of recent warming, we combine our panel estimates from equation 1 of the marginal impact of warming with how much annual temperatures in each district-year differed from their long-term cumulate these effects over the period to calculate the increase or decrease in total output (Fig 5a-b) We emphasize that our estimates are agnostic to the cause of recent warming, and do not necessarily represent the impact of recent anthropogenic warming.
To calculate the cumulative cost of warming for each district we first compute the annual cost of warming from 1951-2000 baseline level:
where T it is the observed temperature of district i in year t, T it is its average temperature over baseline years of 1951-2000, and β 1 and β 2 are our coefficient estimates for the effects of temperature on growth rate from Equation 1. Thus absent warming, district i's counterfactual growth rate and income in year t could bê
where hatted terms are counterfactual and Y indicates GDP per capita in log terms, and y it is the observed growth rate. The cumulative loss in GDP for district i is then
where N it is the population of district i in year t and the sum is computed over all available years Θ in our sample. We focus on the four countries/regions with data back to 2001: the US, EU, Brazil, and Indonesia. Figure S1 : Patterns of spatial correlation in local temperature anomalies lead to noisy inference in country-aggregated data. a. After taking out temperature trends, historical temperature anomalies across the largest metropolitan in the US are often negatively correlated. Each dot represents the temperature anomaly in two metro areas in a year. b. Distribution of pairwise temperature anomalies across all districts within our study sample, for each region. Temperature anomalies are fairly highly correlated in some countries/regions (e.g. Indonesia, India), but often poorly correlated in others (e.g. US, Brazil, China). c-e. Simulated effects of aggregation on the estimated effect of temperature on economic growth, using data from the US+EU (see SI Section 1.3). Black lines give response estimated using the district data (1000 resamples), relative to a year at 20C, red lines give the estimated response after first averaging growth, temperature, and temperature squared across districts within a given year and then estimating temperature response using the country time series. To understand whether growth rates rebound after a transitory, hotter than normal year, we compare our baseline model with no temperature lags (a our main model), with a distributed lag model that includes contemporaneous temperature as well as five year lags in temperature (b). Dark blue lines are bootstrapped estimates of the marginal effects from these regressions (1000 resamples), and black lines the main effect. Figure S9 : Cross-sectional relationship between household wealth and temperature is negative across full sample but flat within countries. To confirm that our exposure disparity in Figure 3 is representative, we assemble geo-referenced cross-sectional data on household asset wealth from 36 developing countries (non overlapping with our sample countries in the main analysis) from the Demographic and Health Surveys, and match these wealth measures to average temperature exposure at each household's location. Households with less asset wealth are much more likely to be exposed to warmer average temperatures when looking across all households in the global sample (a), but this disparity is much weaker when looking only within countries (b).
Figure S10: Robustness of quintile response. We explore the robustness of our income-specific response functions shown in Fig 3 to alternate ways of defining the quintiles or specifying time controls (Section 2). The response for each quintile is shown in colored lines from dark red (poorest) to bright orange (richest). (a) is our main specification in which income quintile is assigned to a district relative to the global sample when it enters our dataset and is fixed throughout. (b) is the specification in which income quintile may change over time, moving depending on districts' relative position in a given year's distribution. We control for time-trending and time-invariant observables that may affect temperature and growth rate separately in each quintile by including quintile-year fixed effects in (a) and (b), whereas (c) and (d) are the fixed and moving quintile specifications without the quintile-year fixed effects. All responses are fairly similar except for the poorest quintiles in (c). 
